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Engineering project outcomes are driven by a 
dynamic mix of the social physics of teams, the unique 
complexities of the engineering challenge at hand, and 
stakeholder pressures in context. Various related 
research has demonstrated formal experiments for 
tightly controlled problems in small teams, including 
work in organizational psychology, computational 
organization theory, design thinking, and coordination 
science. We realize there is room for testing these 
foundational concepts in quasi-controlled 
environments with distributed teams challenged by 
problem, solution, and organization complexity 
common today. This paper presents a quasi-experiment 
to study how engineers proceed through attention, 
decision, and learning cycles in the design of a System 
of Systems. The experiment utilized an ensemble of an 
agent-based model, a decision-support interface, and a 
variety of sensors to record behavior and activity. Four 
pilots for a maritime industry challenge were 
conducted with experienced industry experts, followed 
by a primary experiment for data collection. Though 
this work is preliminary, the experimental approach 
detects (for this case) how designers focused on 
different variables (attention), manipulated variables 
to accomplish desired outcomes (decisions), and 
explored the system performance trade space variously 
over time to reveal false assumptions and uncover 
better decisions (learning). Lessons learned from this 
quasi-experiment are guiding this research team to 
prepare scalable and reproducible engineering 
teamwork experiments that include sensors of events 
over time in the problem, solution, and socials spaces 
of engineering projects. 
 
1. Background  
 
This research is rooted in observations of 
engineering as a social activity across a team of teams 
as they explore fundamental and often counterintuitive 
tradeoffs. [1] In a stable environment, with teams, 
markets, and technologies well understood, 
engineering can be characterized as a drive to 
efficiency through an analytic process, improved with 
decreasing uncertainty over time. Tacit capabilities and 
mental models for successful teams remain aligned 
with internal and external realities. However, for 
modern, disruptive, and strategic industrial needs, 
engineering is much the opposite, proceeding by 
innovation under uncertainty. 
Innovation is a collective capability, involving 
individual behaviors and group dynamics. Design is a 
crucial component of innovation. One example of how 
social behavior affects design decisions is the manner 
in which designers engage with each other to frame 
and re-frame the design problem itself, which 
subsequently influences solutions [2], [3]. 
A team’s mental models can limit their capacity for 
awareness during complex work. Organization 
processes, including those for engineering teams, have 
been proposed to assess, refresh, expand and make 
explicit the mental models of coordinating teams. [4]–
[9] 
While a century ago organizations were conveyed 
as structured, centrally controlled entities; that view 
has given way in recent decades to a more natural 
representation. Kozlowski and others have articulated 
teamwork in an organization as distributed and 
dynamic, and thus our models and research on 
organizations must be multi-level. As such, a mix over 
time of elements, relationships, topology, externalities, 
and dynamics leads to organization as system with 
performance as an emergent outcome. [10], [11] 
Supported by advances in artificial intelligence, 
operations research, and computational organization 
theory, models of teams and organizations are 
simulated, allowing virtual experiments to validate, 
question, and expand existing ethnographic and 
management frameworks. [12]–[15] While there have 
being increasing variants and interesting explorations, 
relatively few of these models for engineering 
teamwork have been validated with reproducibility at 
real world scale. 
 







Recently, with the advent of low-cost pervasive 
sensors and digital twin models, a research opportunity 
has risen to supplement existing frameworks and 
formal experiments with a broader empirical basis. 
[16]–[18]  The motivation of this research is to build 
quasi-experiments for real-world engineering project 
teams supported by digital models and sensors as 
instrumented teamwork. 
 
1.1. Research Framing 
 
We characterize design challenges as being 
composed of the problem space, solution space, and 
social space. A broad motive is to systematically 
observe how the social space influences or perhaps 
even governs how teams navigate the links between 
problems and solutions. In other words, we wish to 
study how the social physics of engineering teams 
influences design process and outcomes [19]. 
These perspectives build on the information 
processing view of innovation and learning in project 
organizations [13], [20]. With change, old information 
loses relevance, uncertainties arise, and new 
information is generated. The position and value of 
information across the network of the organization 
evolves.  Information new to actors in a given situation 
may be a surprise [21]. The relevance of new 
information is not proportional to volume, but a value 
given topological significance of the knowledge. [22] 
Small facts may yield big insights with systemic effect. 
How the organization frames the problem and potential 
solutions may encourage exploration and recognition 
of these surprises. [3] 
An alternative framing for design behavior is 
Berglund & Leifer’s [23] Triple-Loop model (process, 
product, and context) variables, building on Argyris’s 
(1977) Double Loop model of learning [24]. 
A social space is viewed through the position and 
interaction of teams of both individuals and other 
teams (Team of Teams – ToT). Some researchers have 
sought to measure the quality of the social space 
through constructs such as collective intelligence (or C 
factor) [25] or the Interaction Dynamics Notation 
(IDN) [26]. These efforts are among the first to 
develop a cognitive-behavioral model of engineering 
design team performance. Of particular interest in the 
literature on innovation is the role of influence cycles 
[18] in team interactions and the impact on what teams 
focus on (attention), how they arrive at choices 
(decisions), and how they improve on past choices 
(learning) [27]. 
In this ongoing experimental study, we focus on the 
idea that the design process is path-dependent. We seek 
to study how the latent social behaviors associated with 
path-dependent exploration influence design choices 
and outcomes in complex system engineering [1], [28]. 
Path-dependence in a design trade space is 
explained as follows. Engineering teams begin at a 
legacy position in the tradespace, determined by the 
prevailing solution to the problem, tacit knowledge, 
and influenced by externally determined specifications. 
Teams then move through the space, attempting to 
successively improve on the previous positions, i.e. do 
better than where they have been. They eventually 
converge to final choices either by arriving at a pareto 
location, or satisfying requirements under resource 
constraints. The phenomenon of the design walk – the 
path moving through the design space -- can be 
observed and is akin to project shaping [29]. However, 
many underlying latent behaviors such as attention, 
decision, and learning that govern the exploration 
process have until recently been difficult to observe 
and influence. 
A Platform for Quasi Experiments: We realize 
there is room for testing these foundational concepts in 
quasi-controlled environments with distributed teams 
challenged by problem, solution, and organization 
complexity common today. We refer to this level of 
complexity as the meso-scale, in contrast to micro-
scale experiments with individuals and small teams and 
macro-scale experiments relying on population scale 
data. This paper presents a quasi-experiment to study 
how engineers proceed through attention, decision, and 
learning cycles in the design of a System of Systems. 
We pose the following research questions to link the 
unobservable / latent behaviors in the social space to 
the observable events in the problem and solution 
spaces:  
a) Attention allocation – how do individual and 
team behaviors influence the particular design variants 
that teams focus on as they proceed? What are the 
social signals and factors to which the designers are 
attuned in relation to this focus set of variants? 
b) Decision – how do teams evaluate and process 
their design moves by either progressing or regressing 
through the space? What interactions result in 
agreement, or a choice? 
c) Learning – how do teams recognize, process and 
engage over the trade-offs that result from design 
decisions, and how do they alter them to improve upon 
previous choices? 
Our methodology and approach are accordingly 
structured to observe how individuals and teams 
behave at the individual and collective levels [25], 
[30], [31], so that patterns of attention, decision, and 
learning that influence path-dependent design 






2. Methodology & Approach 
 
2.1. Experimental Platform 
 
Improvements in computation and sensing have 
now made it possible to study the activities of 
engineering using a platform that combines models and 
experiments. Such a platform enables (i) the 
deployment of complex computation to the edge, i.e. 
where individuals and teams can use distributed 
devices to handle complex computation in near real-
time, (ii) enable visualization of complex design 
tradespaces to support trade-off evaluation and 
decision-making, and (ii) instrument individuals and 
their environment to observe individual and team 
interaction and behavior. 
These technologies promise to minimize the 
cognitive burden on individuals trying to process 
complex information, which is a major concern in the 
engineering of complex systems [32].  An objective in 
the deployment of these technologies is to free up 
cognitive and emotional capacity for individuals to 
engage in meaningful exchange of insights as they 
explore the tradespace. Recent studies have 
demonstrated that this experimental approach requires 
model development as both boundary object for 
engagement and as support for instrumentation and 
observation [33], [34]. 
 
2.2 Design Challenge Setting 
 
We formulated an engineering challenge for teams 
of teams (ToT) as part of a commercial maritime 
cluster of companies and a national laboratory. The 
cluster consists of stakeholder representatives 
(Figure 1) from the Japanese shipping industry -- 
cargo suppliers and buyers, ship owners and operators, 
infrastructure assets owners including ports and 
bunkering facilities, regulatory system principals, and 
the ship building sector (designers and builders). 
 
 
Figure 1. Maritime shipping stakeholder landscape 
The challenge for these stakeholders (the team of 
teams) is to re-design the integrated marine system to 
comply with revised emissions reduction regulations 
enacted by the IMO MARPOL (International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships). 
The decisions necessary to invest and change the 
industry are dependent across actors and therefore 
require coordination. This revision of the regulation 
mainly sets limits for Sulphur Oxides (SOx) and 
Nitrous Oxides (NOx) emissions from ships’ exhausts, 
and will go in effect in 2020. Thus the new regulations 
create performance targets; participants must study 
how design variants trade-off other performance 
dimensions to meet the newly specified performance 
targets. 
Teams are asked to modify a reference crude oil 
shipping system involving a tankers’ fleet composed of 
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), currently fueled 
with Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) and transporting crude oil 
from a supply port in the Persian Gulf to a delivery 
port in Japan. 
The challenge addresses the expected progressive 
transition from the currently predominant use of HFO 
to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and considers the 
LNG infrastructure needed to support this transition.  
The design goal is to reduce SOx and NOx emissions, 
while fulfilling shipping contracts, at the lowest 
possible cost (Table 1). Individuals representing 
various stakeholders consider, enumerate, and evaluate 
feasible system architectures in a tradespace simulated 
in a computer model. Designers seek the Pareto 
frontier of non-dominated architectures, and choose a 
subset of preferred architectures. 
Table 1. System performance metrics in the design 
exercise 
Objective  Description Metrics Units 
Emissions 
Reduction 
Ability of the system 
to reduce emissions, 
in respect to baseline 













Cargo * km 
Schedule Ability of the system 
to meet the contract 
schedule for crude 








CAPEX The cost of 
installation of new 
LNG bunkering 
facilities, and 
retrofitting crude oil 
tankers. 
Initial Cost MUSD 
OPEX Cost of operating the 
retrofitted crude oil 










2.3 Quasi-Experiment Setup 
 
A quasi-experiment based on the maritime 
transition design challenge was established (Table 2). 
In the exercise, designers can modify designs to 
achieve one or more variants by playing with a limited 
set of architectural decisions.  These decisions and 
options for each decision are represented in a 
morphological matrix. For the crude oil shipping 
system these include propellant fuel for the fleet of 
ships, engine and overall propulsion system 
architecture, fuel tank and vessel layout, fuel bunkering 
and refueling implications, berth flexibility options and 
levels (Table 3). 
Table 2. Experiment variables 
Dependent: Emissions (NOx, SOx, CO2), Waiting 
Time, Cargo Moved, Initial Cost, Fuel Cost Efficiency 
Independent: Number of architectures enumerated, 
Attention allocation to the problem space, Attention 
allocation to the solution space, Number of path dependent 
sequences, Number of surprises, Timestamps 
Controlled: Time limit, System of systems model, 
Demographics (No randomization, quasi-experiment) 
 
Table 3. Matrix of design variables and levels 
Decision Alternatives 
# Ships HFO 
0 5 15 20 
# Ships LSFO 
# Ships LNG 



















# LNG Bunkering 
Facilities by 
Location 
0 1 3 - 
 
The design challenge variables were selected based 
on the research questions to be explored, the typical 
tasks of design teams, and the associated teamwork 
phenomena mapped in Table 4. 
The quasi-experiment was developed through a 
series of four pilot experiments with experienced 
industry professionals at sites in the USA and Japan.  
The pilot experimentation phase also served for 
prototyping the computer simulator that implements 
the system of systems (SoS) model and the interactive 
visualization software user interface. 
 
 
Table 4. Experiment variables mapped to teamwork 













Attention allocation on 
elements of the problem 
space 







Attention allocation on 
elements of the solution 
space 








Attention allocation on 
Elements of the 
problem space 
Learning Number of path 
dependent sequences 







Attention allocation on 
elements of the problem 
space 
Decision System performance 
metrics from selected 
architecture 
 
2.3 Tradespace Simulation 
 
MOSES is an agent-based simulator developed by 
Wanaka for the evaluation of architectural decisions in 
ship transportation systems. [35] The simulator was 
developed based on specific technical and physical 
realities of the ship, shipping, and port for the case in 
the experiment. The simulation was then improved 
through the pilot experimentation phase specifically for 
this exercise. 
There are five types of agents and five types of 
demands (Table 5). Agents have four functions: (i) 
observe, (ii) select, (iii) checkNextEvent, and (iv) 
update.  For each iteration of the simulation, agents 
observe their status and task list according to the 
demand, select their next task, and estimate the next 
event. 






Further to the computer simulator MOSES 
introduced here, the experiment developed is 
instrumented and aided by several other software 
packages, the most significant of them being the so-
called Maritime Decision Support System (DSS). 
The Maritime DSS software is a package of open 
source software developed by Winder.  It enables 
teams engaged in the design problem to generate and 
evaluate architectures with enhanced visualization 
features. It provides a UI that augments a team’s 
understanding of the problem and the solution spaces, 
as well as the underlying system model of the 
simulator and its assumptions. During the experiment, 
socio-metric data is collected passively while the teams 
engage in solving the design problem. 
Figure 2 provides a snapshot of the UI.  The left-
hand toolbar allows users to configure and simulate a 
unique shipping fleet. The right-hand toolbar allows 
users to explore seven dimensions of KPIs (the system 
performance objectives or -ilities).  The KPI plot 
(lower right) allows users to track and revisit the 
performance of multiple scenarios over time in a 
tradespace format. 
The Maritime DSS has a module called “Team 
Space IO” for analysis of “fingerprints” data collected 
(Figure 3).  By cross-referencing fingerprint data with 
other time-stamped observations about intention, 




Figure 2. Maritime DSS UI 
We focus on two broad categories of data: 
● Attention: We measure attention by knowing 
what subset of information (i.e. KPIs) users are 
viewing over time.  We can also view which inputs are 
changed. 
● Performance: Performance is evaluated relative 
to other teams and relative to a simulated tradespace. 
 
Figure 3. Sensor output interface for Maritime DSS 
system 
3. Experiment Results 
 
3.1. Attention Allocation by Teams 
 
Attention allocation on the variables of the problem 
space can be sensed by recording how much time a 
tradespace variable was set or remained set to a certain 
system performance objective. 
The major objectives subject of attention in this 
experiment have been Fuel Cost, Cargo Moved and 
Initial Cost. The following Figure 4 provides the 
distribution of attention into the different trade 
variables in the very moment that a team performed a 
simulation or a recall. 
 
Figure 4. Tradespace variables on which teams 
focused 
The results documented in Table 6 show that there is a 
variance in how teams allocated attention to variables. 
Table 6. Attention Allocation on Variables of the 






Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of attention into 
the possible trade-offs between objectives by different 
teams. Some teams evaluated architectures from more 
viewpoints (checked more types of trade-offs) than the 
other teams. 
 
Figure 5: Joint variables on which teams focused 
Figure 6 provides an aggregated view of the 
density of categories of changes through time by 
different teams. 
 
Figure 6. Architectural Changes by Teams over 
Time 
A few teams seem to have concentrated more on 
changing bunkering infrastructure options rather than 
on ship portfolio options, while the other teams seem 
to have had a more balanced distribution of focus on 
design inputs.  This can also be observed in the 
following Table 7, which shows the dominant areas of 
attention. 
Table 7. Attention Allocation on Variables of the 
Solution Space for different Teams 
 
3.2. Decisions by Teams 
 
The design goal of the exercise was to reduce SOx 
emissions and NOx emissions, while fulfilling shipping 
contracts, at the lowest possible cost. Figure 7 plots 
the time series of the outcomes for a sample of 
different teams.  Team 1, 2 and 4 have a very large 
number of data points, while Team 3 and 5 have much 
less. 
 
Figure 7. Performance variable changes over time 
by each of 5 teams; team 1 at top (red), team 5 at 
bottom (purple) 
Teams interpreted the design goals differently. The 
Post-survey collected from each team identifies the 
design strategy followed for this experiment: 
● Team 1 (red): “Maximize Cargo Moved and 
minimize Fuel Cost, while keeping Emissions as low 
as possible”. 
● Team 2 (green): “Decrease Fuel Cost, with a 
compromise on Emissions and Cargo Moved”.  
● Team 3 (blue): “Minimize Emissions and long-
term operation cost”.  
● Team 4 (yellow): “Maximize revenue first, and 
achieve lower SOX/NOX as a secondary goal. To this 
end, we identified that the main variables contributing 
to revenue were Cargo moved, Fuel cost, and capital 





● Team 5 (purple): “Maximize Cargo Moved, and 
minimize Fuel Cost and Capital Cost, while keeping 
Emissions reduction reasonable”. 
In terms of design strategies, the teams approached 
the design walk differently: 
● Team 1 considered/ enumerated new 
architectures, evaluated them and then compared them 
with (recalled) previous architectures in cycles, 
converging to their selected architecture. 
● Team 2’s design walk shows that they simulated 
many times and did not use the recall function.  It is 
not clear how many of the simulations are in effect 
actually a recall without further analysis. 
● Team 3’s design walk shows they simulated 
fewer architectures and recalled a few times. 
● Team 4 attempted to generate the simulated 
tradespace, analyzed it (through recalls), defined 
design goals, and selected an architecture. 
● Team 5’ design walk shows they simulated fewer 
architectures and recalled only a handful of times. 
 
3.2. Learning Cycles by Teams 
 
A method used in this quasi-experiment to detect 
and analyze learning cycles is illustrated with a 
detailed review of Team 1.  The nature of the surprises 
encountered, the associated outcomes, and subsequent 
changes are visualized. 
A learning cycle is defined as a process by which a 
team considers, evaluates, and reflects about design 
choices. Learning cycles are characterized by the 
encounter of surprises followed by a set of changes in a 
sequence as the team explores in response to the new 
information in the surprise. 
Identification of learning cycles of teams is 
performed by detecting when and why design teams 
encounter surprises while carrying out a design task, 
and reviewing the design changes they execute. The 
changes are driven by design goals. Mental models of 
the team evolve with the new information obtained and 
the associated reflection and reframing that happens 
after encountering a surprise. When a team fixes design 
variables after having encountered a surprise (i.e. after 
having learned something new about system dynamics) 
then continues exploring changes to other design 
variables, we speak about a path-dependent sequence 
of design solutions. The new design solutions tested 
may be dependent on insights derived from previous 
design solutions. This procedure has been applied to 
four different teams in the frame of two design 
workshops. 
Table 9. Definitions for identifying learning cycles 
Variable Description 
Surprise Indicates the point in time in their design walk 
when a team encountered a surprise. 
Variable Description 
Architecture The system configuration, a set of design 
decisions, that was considered and evaluated 
when the team encountered the surprise. 
Recorded Reasons 
for Surprise 
The reasons the team judged the outcomes 
different than expected. A surprise is 
encountered when system performance is 
better or worse than expected.   
Potential Learning 
and likely decision 
in course of action 
What the teams possibly learned about the 
specific system dynamics and what they 
probably decided for the next moves in their 
design process. 
Subsequent 
Changes until next 
Surprise 
The type of design changes that the team 
explored until the time they encountered 
another surprise in their design process. 
 
Figure 8 provides the time series of outcomes and 
design changes, whereby the architectures enumerated 
(i.e. the time that an architecture considered was first 
simulated -marked with asterisks), and recalled (i.e. the 
times that an architecture previously enumerated was 
recalled -marked with red dots) are highlighted. 
Learning cycles are plotted as black lines 
connecting the asterisks. Phases of the design walk are 
identified in the figure as follows: (1) is an exploratory 
phase, whereby mental models were likely initially 
confirmed or challenged. In this initial phase we can 
see fewer recalls, as there are fewer architectures to be 
recalled, and the first systemic surprises/ learnings 
emerge.  In this phase we also see more testing of both 
Ship Portfolio and Bunkering options; (2) comprises an 
analysis phase, where there is higher density of recalls 
(i.e. comparison between architectures) and where 
path-dependent sequences are established.  In this 
phase we also see more testing of bunkering options; 
(3) appears to be a deliberation phase, including a 4min 
pause before 11 am; (4) indicates a fine-tuning phase, 
with some last new architectures and very high density 
of recalls from the array of LNG and Dual Fuel hybrid 
fleet options, i.e. testing of Ship Portfolio details with a 
fixed bunkering decision; ending in (5) a final decision 
phase characterized by a 7min pause and some recalls. 
Table 8. Features of architecture selected by Team 1 
 
A first path-dependent sequence of Ship Portfolio 
(incl. 10xDual-fueled ships) seems to have been 
triggered by Surprise 5 (the first time the selected 
architecture was considered). This surprise likely 
caused a reframing about the positive effects of 
designing for a half fleet of LNG ships. This is 
identified in Table 10. The elements of surprise are 
highlighted with yellow circles (i.e. Better performance 
than anticipated in all variables), and the associated 










The second path-dependent sequence is triggered 
by Surprise 2 (i.e. Shore-to-Ship too high an 
investment), after which most of the design walk 
considers Ship-to-Ship configurations, with some 
checks on Truck-to-Ship, on an attempt to verify a 
significant reduction in Initial Cost (Surprise 7). The 
related outcomes that resulted different than 
anticipated are marked with pink circles (i.e. Worse 
Cargo Moved, Fuel Cost, and Initial Cost than 
anticipated), and the Ship-to-Ship bunkering choices 
made thereafter can be seen in the sequences marked 
with a pink rectangle. 
A third path-dependent sequence is triggered by 
Surprise 6 (i.e. Further investigate 10LNG/10Dual 
configurations).  This surprise likely caused a 
reframing about the effect of including any number of 
HFO ships in a fleet, thereby confirming the Ship 
Portfolio configuration of the selected architecture. 
Surprise 6 on Worse Emissions than expected has been 
marked with a blue circle and the associated sequence 
of Ship Portfolio choices with a blue rectangle. 
A fourth path-dependent sequence is triggered by 
Surprise 9, however the insight was first discovered at 
Surprise 5 (i.e. Bunkering in Singapore could work 
too.).  This confirms the location of the bunkering 
point in Singapore. Surprise 9 (Worse Cargo Moved, 
and Fuel Cost than anticipated) is marked with green 
circles, and the path-dependent sequence with a green 
rectangle. 
Regarding the number of bunkers, it could be 
argued that the team had a pre-existing mental model 
that supported one bunker configurations (most of their 
architectures considered feature one or no bunkers). 




Previous Arch. Recorded 
Reasons for 
Surprise 
Potential Learning and 





















10x LNG, 10x Dual 
1x in PG, Shore-to-
Ship 
1x Bunker (JP), Shore-
to-Ship 
5 10x LSFO, 10x Dual 
1x Bunker (PG), Ship-
to-Ship 



















10x LNG, 10x Dual 
1x LNG (SG), Ship-to-
Ship 
6 10x HFO, 10x Dual 
1x Bunker (PG), Ship-
to-Ship 






Team wrote: “Capital 
cost not changing 
huge, NOx and SOx 
went up, SOx same” 
Do not further 








5x HFO, 5x LNG, 10x 
Dual 





Previous Arch. Recorded 
Reasons for 
Surprise 
Potential Learning and 






7 5x HFO, 5x LNG, 10x 
Dual. 






Team wrote: “Not 
huge benefit in capital 
cost by changing to 
truck to ship, should 









10x LNG, 10x Dual. 
1x Bunker (PG), Ship-
to-Ship 
1x Bunker (JP), Truck-
to-Ship 
9 10x LNG, 10x Dual. 
3x Bunker (PG), Ship-
to-Ship 








1 bunker in Singapore 
seems a good option. 
Continue exploring 
bunkering. 
Note: Team wrote: 
“Didn't change cargo 
moved, fuel costs 






10x LNG, 10x Dual. 
3x Bunker (SG), Ship-
to-Ship 
 
3.4. Team Performance 
 
Teams were ranked based on the performance of 
their selected architectures. For every trade-off, each 
architecture is compared to the others in the two 
objectives of the trade-off.  The comparison consists of 
a simple estimate of the distances between the one 
architecture subject of analysis and the best performing 
architecture in both of the trade-off objectives. 
 
 
Figure 9. Selected architecture performance plotted 
on Cost, NOx, Cargo, and Fuel tradespaces. 
The selected trade-offs are the most likely that the 
teams considered in their design walks, according to 
their statement of design principles (goals), and the 




equally weighted, so that a “Global Rank” is calculated 
simply aggregating the “Trade-off Ranks”. 
In cases were the distances are similar, distances to 
an imaginary point that would be non-dominated have 
been calculated.  That is the case with Team 3 and 
Team 4’s solutions in Cargo Moved vs. Fuel Cost, and 
Team 3 and Team 5 in NOx Emissions vs. Fuel Cost.  
This is shown in Figure 10, the intent is to illustrate 
possible easy ways to calculate relative ranks. 
 
Figure 10. NOx vs. Fuel Cost by Team. Distances to 
an imaginary non-dominated point in team 3 & 5’s 
solutions. 
Table 11. Performance ranking 
 
According to this performance assessment, Team 1, 
2, 4, and 5 performed better than Team 3.  However, 
Team 3 was the only team that stated slightly different 
design goals giving Emissions Reduction a higher 
priority than the other teams.   
We observe that even on NOx Emissions vs. Initial 
Cost, Team 1, 2, and 5 perform better on NOx 
Emissions (and even dominate Team 3’s solution).  
Another example is with NOx Emissions vs. Fuel Cost, 
whereby we can see the same on NOx Emissions and 
both Team 1 and 2 dominate Team 3’s solution.  Then, 
it could be argued that Team 1, 2 and 5’s higher 
performance ranking than Team 3 is justified. 
 
4. Key Findings 
 
For this maritime cluster expert workshop, a model 
and simulation of the system, the marine crude oil 
shipping industry, was effective in enabling teams to 
enumerate possible design variants and to visualize the 
tradeoffs of various configurations.  
To assess cognitive behavioral aspects, during 4 
pilots workshops and one quasi-experiment this 
research prototyped methods for instrumenting the 
individual’s attention allocation processes. We also 
observed decision-making and learning aspects of the 
attention-decision-learning cycle of influence. These 
sensors and the quasi experiment platform are work in 
progress. 
 
4.1. Proposed Hypotheses 
 
This quasi-experiment leads the authors to propose 
a more formal exploration of five testable hypotheses 
(shown in Figure 12). The units of analysis are 
individuals and teams. 
 
Figure 11. Testable hypotheses 
The quasi-experimental results – not conclusive by 
themselves - provide insights for a preparation of 
Do higher-performing teams explore more through 
their design walks than lower performing teams?  
H1: Higher-performing teams enumerate more architectures 
than lower performing teams. 
Do higher-performing teams learn more through their 
design walks than other teams? 
H2: Higher-performing teams encounter more surprises 
than lower performing teams. 
H3: The design walk of higher-performing teams contains 
more path-dependent sequences of systemic relevance, than 
the design walk of lower performing teams. 
Do teams with clear goals learn more through their 
design walks than teams with unclear goals? 
H4: Teams that agree on clear design goals encounter more 
surprises than teams with unclear goals. 
Do teams that approach design problems from different 
perspectives learn more through their design walks than 
teams with narrow perspectives?  
H5: Teams that focus their attention on more problem 
variables encounter more surprises, than teams that spread 




scaled experiments with controlled testing of 
hypotheses.  In this case: 
H1: Higher-performing teams enumerate more 
architectures, than lower performing teams. 
Teams 1, 2, and 5 enumerated 17, 14, and 18 
architectures, respectively, while Team 3 enumerated 6 
architectures only.  Team 4 is excluded from this 
evaluation, as they approached the design challenge in 
a fundamentally different way than the other teams. 
H2: Higher-performing teams encounter more 
surprises, than lower performing teams. 
Teams 1, 2, and 5 recorded 14, 7, and 10 surprises, 
respectively, while Team 3 encountered 4 only.  Team 
4 recorded 5 insights through their analysis, but once 
again, it is difficult to compare this figure with the 
others because of the different approach they followed. 
H3: The design walk of higher-performing 
teams contains more path-dependent sequences of 
systemic relevance, than the design walk of lower 
performing teams. 
This hypothesis addresses the idea that higher-
performing teams learn more through their design 
walks, than lower performing teams. 
This hypothesis could not be evaluated, as only 
Team 1’s design walk was studied in depth. 
H4: Teams that agree on clear design goals 
encounter more surprises, than teams with unclear 
goals. 
In the main experiment, all teams seem to have 
defined more clear design goals at the outset of the 
challenge, as opposed to what was observed in the 
previous pilot experiment, and the attention allocation 
data confirms these goals, except for Team 3. 
While Team 3 mentioned a design goal in 
minimizing Emissions, we observe that Team 3’s 
attention allocation data indicates a higher focus on 
Cargo Moved (not Emissions).  This finding suggests 
that Team 3 did not focus on their agreed design goals. 
This could be verified by reviewing the audio files.   
H5: Teams that focus their attention on more 
problem variables encounter more surprises, than 
teams that spread their attention over fewer 
problem variables. 
In this quasi-experiment, the higher performing 
teams explored more of the tradespace than lower 
performing teams. 
 
4.2. Discussion and Lessons 
 
The team performance ranking method used in this 
thesis project should be reviewed, and more precise 
algorithms developed. Rather than only surprises, one 
can explore more types of learning events, as we have 
seen that not only unexpected results can trigger 
reflection and learning. Consolidation of insights might 
also be considered as a learning event. 
Machine audio analysis proved infeasible in the 
experiment conditions, making “manual” analysis the 
only way to index the recordings.  Alternative methods 
for audio analysis should be developed. Sentiment 
analysis of audio files could be implemented, whereby 
validation of surprises could be obtained.  Possibly, 
non-disruptive video recording tools could be tested for 
capturing/ validating team’s mood correlating it to the 
timestamp of surprises. 
All steps of the experiment procedure (incl. 
registration, pre-survey, and post-survey) should be 
integrated within one platform that makes the 
experiment participation seamless. Further work 
should also focus on the scalability and reproducibility 
of experiments in an industrial setting for collection of 
larger amounts of data. 
 
4.3. Future Work 
 
Based on ongoing and future work we will report in 
detail on the chosen approach to instrumentation, early 
results, implications for subsequent rounds of 
experiments and the consistency of observations with 
other recent literature. We will also lay out the specific 
testable hypotheses we intend to test before launching 
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